OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible We propose a new interpretation of this result in terms of a pair of separable belief functions, one of them modelling testimonies while the other represents the idea of prejudice. The role of the latter is to weaken the weights of the focal sets of the former separable belief function. This bipolar view accounts for a form of resistance to accept the information supplied by the sources, which differs from the discounting of sources.
Introduction
G. Shafer [1] has presented his theory of belief functions essentially as an approach to the fusion of unreliable elementary testimonies, each being represented by simple support functions. However many belief functions prove to be not separable, i.e., not the orthogonal sum of simple support functions. Ph. Smets [2] tries to remedy this difficulty by generalizing simple support functions, showing that any belief function is the conjunctive combination of such generalized elementary belief functions (where some masses can be negative). Using a retraction operation, he shows that any belief function can be decomposed into two separable belief functions. One represents the fusion of elementary testimonies (expressing confidence), and the other (expressing doubt) plays the role of a moderator that can annihilate, via retraction, some information supplied by the former, possibly resulting in ignorance. This pair of belief functions is called "Latent Belief Structure" by Smets. In this paper, we present a bipolar belief function model which pushes the notion of "Latent Belief Structure" further. In a belief function, the doubt component is assumed to reflect a cognitive bias interpreted as a prejudice, pertaining to the information supplied by the confidence component. This cognitive bias leads to weaken the strength attached to the combination of some elementary testimonies appearing in the confidence part, thus expressing a lack of trust in the information obtained by merging these testimonies.
The organization of the rest paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, some necessary background on belief functions is introduced. In Sect. 3, we propose new results about the decomposition of belief functions, providing new insights in the weight function introduced by Smets [2] , as well as conditions for separability in a simple case. Section 4 presents a generalized setting for the merging of elementary testimonies in the presence of prejudices, focusing on the process of belief attenuation by means of the retraction operation. This framework is illustrated on the Linda example [3] , highlighting the difference between belief retraction and source discounting.
Separable Belief Functions
In Shafer evidence theory, the uncertainty concerning an agent's state of belief on a finite set of possible situations, called the frame of discernment Ω is represented by a basic belief assignment (BBA) or mass function m defined as a mapping The value x, we call diffidence weight, evaluates the lack of reliability of the testimony (or the source of information). A vacuous BBA can thus be denoted by A 1 for any A ⊂ Ω, and a categorical BBA A = Ω can be denoted by A 0 . A belief function Bel(A) is a non-additive set function which represents the total quantity of belief in the subset A of Ω and is defined by Bel(A) = ∅ =B⊆A m(B). A BBA m can be equivalently represented by its associated plausibility and commonality functions respectively defined for all A ⊆ Ω by
The conjunctive combination of BBA's m j derived from k distinct sources,
Note that m ∩ is not always normal. Dempster's rule, denoted by ⊕, is a normalized version of the conjunctive combination rule and is defined such that: m ⊕ (∅) = 0 and m ⊕ (A) = K · m ∩ for A = ∅. The normalization factor K is of the form
represents the amount of conflict between the sources. These two combination rules are commutative, associative, and generally used to combine BBAs from distinct sources. The Dempster rule is simply expressed using the commonality functions as: A and B are two of its focal sets such as A∩B = ∅, then A∩B is a focal set of Bel. The condition A ∩ B = ∅ can be dropped if we allow for sub-normalized belief functions. But the converse is not true. This necessary condition clearly indicates that not all belief functions are separable. To overcome this difficulty, Smets [2] generalized the concept of simple support function, considering A x such that x ∈ (0, +∞). Smets has shown that any non dogmatic BBA can be decomposed into the conjunctive combination of generalized BBA's:
, extending the range of diffidence functions w to (0, +∞). For every A ⊂ Ω, the weights w(A) are obtained from the commonality function of m as:
The Bipolar Decomposition of a Belief Function
We can write the decomposition of a non-dogmatic belief function as m = (
), where -w + and w − are standard diffidence functions in (0, 1) defined from the original one w associated to m, such that: w + (A) = min(1, w(A)), and w
) is the retraction operation, also obtained by the division of commonality functions: [5] . Ginsberg [6] and Kramosil [7] have exploited this division rule. [2] more recently studied in [4, 8, 9] . The existence of positive and negative information is generally coined under the term bipolarity [10] , an idea applied to latent belief structures in [11] . A general study of the canonical conjunctive decomposition of a belief function was realised by Ke et al. [12] and Pichon [13] , albeit without focusing on its possible meaning.
In the following we are interested in retrieving the mass function m from its diffidence function w via the commonality function rather by the conjunctive combination. First, note that the expression B⊇A Q(B)
|B|−|A|+1 makes sense for A = Ω, and we get w(Ω) = 1/Q(Ω). So function w can be extended to the whole of 2 S , even if only sets A ⊂ Ω appear in the decomposition formula. In previous studies, w(Ω) remained undefined. Of course, w(Ω) > 1 but this will be also the case for the diffidence weights of other subsets for non-separable belief functions.
Noticing that m(A) = A⊆B (−1) |B|−|A| Q(B), and moreover log w(A) =
, it is clear that m is to Q what − log w is to log Q. Since Q(A) = A⊆B m(B), we have log Q(A) = A⊆B log(1/w(B)) = log A⊆B 1 w(B) . Hence,
Note that in (1), the weight w(Ω) appears explicitly in all the expressions of Q(A) for all subsets A. Hence we can retrieve the BBA m, from the diffidence function w computed from it, directly as m(E) = E⊆A (−1)
). In particular we can have the following result: We can decompose m as a combination m = {ab} w(ab) ∩ {ac} w(ac) ∩ {a} w(a) . Its diffidence function is given in Table 1 . 
Finally, we can study the variation of the diffidence weights when α ranges from 0 to its maximum 1 − β − γ. Note that w(a) is the mass of Ω for the SBBA m a focusing on a, when considering the decomposition of the BBA m. The less w(a) the stronger is the testimony pointing to a, the testimony is not present if w(a) = 1, and it becomes a prejudice against a when w(a) > 1. It can be checked (see Fig. 1 -w(a) increases with α ≥ α and lim α→1−β−γ w(a) = +∞.
Looking at the right part of Fig. 1 , we note that when α = 0, w(a) > 1 and testimonies in favor of ab and ac are weak; so the prejudice against a is strong enough to erase the focal set a from m. When w(a) reaches its minimal value, the prejudice in favor of a is maximal. When α is close to its maximum value 1 − β − γ, testimonies in favor of ab and ac are less and less challenged since their diffidence weights get close to 0, while the prejudice against a rapidly increases to infinity. At the limit, we get a dogmatic belief function with m(a) = 1 − β − γ and the prejudice no longer compensates the elementary testimonies in favor of ab and ac.
Prejudiced Information Fusion
A generalized SBBA focused on a subset E with diffidence weight x represents the idea that "one has some reason to believe that the actual world is in E (and nothing more)" when x is small (x < 1), whereas, when x > 1, it expresses the idea that "one has some reason not to believe that the actual world is in E" [2] , what we called prejudice. Note that the latter does not mean that we have a reason to believe the complement E of E (which would mean assigning a weight x < 1 to E). In this section, we try to provide an interpretation of non-separable belief functions in terms of merging elementary testimonies with prejudices that weaken the result of the former merging. The idea is that the agent possessing a prejudice of strength y > 1 against believing E is ready to doubt about the truth of E whenever receiving a testimony claiming that E is true. More generally, the combination A x ∩ B y of a simple BBA A x , x < 1 with a simple prejudice B y , y > 1 yields the diffidence function w(·) such that:
and w(A) = xy if A = B. So, it is a belief function if and only if A = B and xy < 1. It is equivalent to erode the testimony A x with another testimony A 1/y using retraction. In particular, A x ∩ A 1/x yields total ignorance. However, erosion cannot alter A x by retracting B = A. We can compare the erosion with discounting an SSB A x : the discounting procedure reduces the mass 1 − x bearing on A with a factor δ ∈ [0, 1] and yields m δ (A) = A (1−δ)+δ.x , which is equal to A xy provided that 0 < δ = 1−xy
More generally we can retract a focal set B from a separable mass function
and its combination with a prejudice B x , x > 1. Focal sets of m are of the form E I = ∩ i∈I A i , I ⊆ {1, . . . k} with masses m(E I ) = i∈I (1 − w i ) i ∈I w i (where we allow that some E I 's may be identical). Combining this mass function with E x J yields a mass function
. So E I is erased from the focal sets of m by E x J if and only if
, which is clearly more than 1. Note that we can erode a single focal set via retraction, while discounting affects all focal sets to the same extent. Similarly, it can be checked that if
′ (E I ) = xm(E I ), which is provably less than 1. In other words, retracting the focal set E J erases all focal sets E I ⊂ E J as well, namely all combinations between the merging of information from sources indexed in J, with information from other sources.
So we can consider that any belief function comes from merging unreliable elementary testimonies, with prejudices that weaken the weights pertaining to the conjunctions of information items coming from sources. It is indeed natural to consider that information we receive from the outside is challenged by our prior information taking the form of stereotypes, or prejudices that one is often unaware of. The receiver is reluctant to consider the result of such conjunction valid. For instance, consider a variant of the Linda problem [3] . In this case, the bank teller Linda, depicted as a philanthropist, is found by participants to a psychological experiment, more likely to be a philanthropist bank teller than a bank teller, because the former looks more "representative" or typical of persons who might fit the description of Linda. Here we consider the case when we receive two testimonies, namely one (B v ) claiming that Linda is a banker and another one A w that she is a philanthropist. The fusion process leads us to allocate a belief degree (1 − v)(1 − w) to the fact that she is a philanthropist bank teller. However, a prejudiced individual would hardly believe that a bank teller can be philanthropist, and would like to erode, possibly erase, this belief by combining the result of the fusion with the generalized SSB (A ∩ B) u with 1 < u ≤ 1/(v + w − vw), which leads to a belief degree equal to 1 − (u + v − vw)u, that is all the lesser as the prejudice is strong.
Conclusion
This paper revisits the decomposition of a belief function into a combination of generalized simple support functions proposed by Smets [2] showing that it can be viewed as the merging of uncertain testimonies and of prejudices against the results of their partial conjunctions. We have laid bare new formal properties of the diffidence function w and shown how to reconstruct the BBA m from it via Moebius-like transforms. Our results strengthen the approach to belief function based on the merging of pieces of evidence, as opposed to the approach based on upper and lower probability. Future research can be a study of the information ordering based on diffidence functions, introduced by Denoeux [4] , on which our results can shed more light.
